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There is a vibrant regional civil society in Asia with numerous civil society organizations (CSOs) 
advancing  a  range  of  economic,  political  and  social  causes  using three key  strategies,  namely 
regional  advocacy,  civil  society  parallel  summits,  and  civil  society  partnerships  with  states  and 
regional institutions. Although regional institutions have become more willing to engage with non-
elite  or  grassroots  civil  society  and  labor  groups,  business  networks  are  still  privileged  in 
institutional processes. Consequently, regional institutions fail to tap the information and knowledge 
resources  of  CSOs  to  enhance  the  quality  of  regional  institutional  governance,  defined  as  the 
effectiveness of governance institutions as well as their accountability to stakeholders. The paper 
outlines three interrelated strategies to correct this deficit. First, regional institutions should provide 
and safeguard a regional ―public sphere‖ in which officials and a variety of CSOs, not just those 
sharing official views, can engage each other in reasoned discussion. Second, regional institutions 
should develop more formalized or regularized mechanisms (as opposed to ad hoc  or informal 
measures) through which CSOs can submit research reports, position papers, and comments on 
the various items on the regional institutional agenda, particularly on new agreements. The Asian 
Development Bank‘s NGO and Civil Society Center offers one institutional model. Third, regional 
institutions  should  establish  formal  accountability  mechanisms  such  as  a  formal  complaints 
procedure  through  which  stakeholders  and  their  CSO  representatives  can  bring  claims  against 
regional institutions as well as internal and independent evaluation mechanisms. 
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1.  Introduction and Key Study Questions  
 
Asia is home to a variety of institutional arrangements aimed at addressing the growing array of 
transnational problems that its states and societies collectively face. This is particularly evident in a 
globalizing world that has expanded the range of interdependencies between states and peoples—
and where external rules increasingly impact life within states.
 Because of their aim to address 
shared problems, these regional institutions
1 function as governance arrangements through which 
participants attempt to arrive at common understandings of shared problems, devise possible ways 
of addressing them, and allocate institutional resources to manage them. What is significant about 
these governance arrangements is their diversity not only in terms of the issue areas or agendas, 
but also in terms of who participates and their institutional form or design. In fact, Asian regionalism 
appears  to  conform  to  what  scholars  have  identified  as  the  ―new  regionalism,‖  a  set  of 
multidimensional forms of  collaboration  spanning  economic,  environmental,  social,  political,  and 
security issues, involving not only states but a variety of non-state actors from the private sector, 
the academic world of research institutes, universities and think tanks, and, to a far lesser degree, 
non-elite actors such as labor and grassroots civic groups
2 (Cox and Sinclair, 1996; Hettne, 1999; 
Grugel, 2004).  
 
Since the late 1980s, the number of civil society organizations (CSOs) operating in Asia has grown 
tremendously,  a  significant  proportion  of  which  focus  on  domestic  issues  and  problems  in  the 
countries in which they are located. Likewise, labor activism remains, to a large degree, nationally-
focused. But, networks of CSOs operating transnationally have also expanded in tandem with the 
growth of regional institutions in Asia. While it is difficult to establish a causal link between the two 
phenomena with any great certainty, it is nonetheless possible to argue that the growth of civil 
society activity in Asia, as with the expansion of regional institutions, are parallel responses to the 
challenges and problems arising from the growth of global and regional interdependencies  that 
require collective action beyond national borders. But, civil society activity has also been targeted at 
specific agendas of the region‘s various institutions, including those of the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB). Moreover, domestic-focused CSOs and labor groups in the region also choose to operate 
across  national  boundaries  if  they  find  that  regional  spheres  offer  a  more  accommodating 
environment for them to organize, operate in, and be heard compared with national spaces. In fact, 
civil society activists do have a tendency to shift the scale of their local and national contentions to 
the regional (and perhaps even global) level in order to both engage different sets of authoritative 
actors  and to  re-frame  and  therefore  legitimize  local  claims  as  broader,  even  universalist  ones 
(Tarrow, 2005). In turn, CSOs working on global governance issues and problems often localize 
their  activities  as  they  link their  global  agendas  to  related  local  issues  and  situations,  in  effect 
working through bottom-up processes to effect global change. The end result is the consolidation of 
a networked, transnational civil society space linking local, national, regional, and global levels that 
adds to the complex of regional governance arrangements in Asia.  
                                                 
1  Although institutions are sometimes equated with formal organizations, they are best regarded more broadly as 
―sets  of  implicit  or  explicit  principles,  norms,  rules  and  decision-making  procedures  around  which  actors‘ 
expectations converge in a given issue area‖ (Krasner, 1982: 186). In this formulation, international organizations 
are a subset of international institutions. International institutions aid cooperation by allowing for regular interaction 
and  information  exchange  among  institutional  participants,  a  framework  of  principles  and  rules  about  how 
‖members‖ should behave with respect to a particular issue, and procedures for how institutional participants set 
agendas as well as make and implement decisions. 
2  This  paper  uses  the  term  ―grassroots  civic  groups‖  interchangeably  with  the  term,  ―civil  society  organizations‖ 
(CSOs), which are defined to include loose groups of civil society actors acting collectively as well as formalized, 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs).  2          |  Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 63 
 
A  number  of  questions  may  be  asked  about  these  trends  in  regional  civil  society  and  labor 
networking and their engagement with regional institutions in Asia:  
 
i.  What is the nature of CSOs and labor groups in Asia, what are their key areas of concern, 
and what strategies do they adopt to advance their respective causes?  How much variation 
is there in the way CSOs and labor groups operate across different Asian countries?  
ii.  To what extent can we say that a regional civil society exists in Asia, what key substantive 
issues do groups operating in this realm raise with regional institutions and how do these 
groups act in order to advance their respective causes?  Have regional institutions been 
structured  in  ways  that encourage  and facilitate  their  engagement  with  CSOs  and  labor 
groups? 
iii.  How might the involvement of these groups affect the working of regional institutions, in 
particular their effectiveness in addressing the transnational and domestic challenges facing 
the region‘s states and peoples and their accountability to stakeholders? In short, can CSOs 
and labor groups make a difference to the quality of regional governance?  
iv.  If non-elite groups are valuable actors in regional governance, should their interactions with 
regional institutions be enhanced, and if so, how can that be achieved? 
 
In addressing these questions, the paper focuses on non-elite civic groups as well as non-business 
actors such as labor. Thus, the paper will not directly address the various elite networks of scholars 
that are also considered to be part of Asian regional civil society—networks such as ASEAN-ISIS 
(ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies), CSCAP (Council for Security Cooperation 
in the Asia Pacific), or PECC (Pacific Economic Cooperation Council), what has been termed the 
Track II policy networks that contribute in various ways to regional governance.
3 Although a number 
of global CSOs such as Oxford Famine Relief (OXFAM), World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), and 
Amnesty International could be regarded as ―elite‖ actors today—given their position at the apex of 
the civil society realm and the role they are often called on to play in governance arrangements—
this  study  will  consider  them  to  be  part  of  non-elite  CSOs.  This  is  due  to  their  broad-based 
membership  and  sustained  links  with  the  grassroots—individuals,  groups,  communities,  or  the 
masses whose cause they are advocating—whether directly or indirectly through respective local 
chapters or other local CSOs. The paper does not address business networks.  
 
A core aim of this paper is to explore whether and under what conditions a regional civil society 
space is taking shape in Asia where CSOs and labor groups collectively organize, attempting to 
influence  both  national  and  regional  governance  agendas  and  institutional  processes.  While 
referring to this space as regional civil society conveys some sense of its structural, functional, and 
normative  features—as  an  associational  realm  through  which  individuals  and  groups  act  to 
influence official policy and forge the good society—a number of scholars have questioned the 
relevance of the civil society concept to Asia. This is because Asian political and cultural contexts 
render meaningless the notion of civil society as an autonomous sphere of organization by non-
state  and  non-market  groups,  whether  taking  place  domestically  or  transnationally.  It  is  to  this 
conceptual  question  that  this  paper  first  turns  before  addressing  the  main  research  questions 
posed. 
 
Following  this  Introduction,  Section  2  surveys  the  conceptual  literature  on  civil  society,  asking 
whether the term is indeed alien to Asia, what analytical and practical gains may be obtained in 
using  such  a  contested  concept,  and  how  the notion  of  civil  society  might  help  us  think  about 
enhancing  the  quality  of  regional  governance  and  its  implications  for  the  regional  institutional 
architecture. Section 3 reviews the literature on civil society in Asia, drawing out in broad terms the 
                                                 
3  On Track II networks in East Asia, see Acharya (2004), Caballero-Anthony (2005) and Morrison (2006).  
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experiences of CSOs in different Asian countries and highlighting how political regime type, state 
capacity, and the nature of state-society relations conditions the space within which CSOs operate. 
Section 4 discusses regional civil society networks and their engagement with regional institutions 
in  Asia,  beginning  with  a  very  brief  survey  of  the  region‘s  complex  institutional  architecture for 
regional governance. The discussion goes on to highlight the substantive areas of concern that 
CSOs raise with respect to regional institutions and examines the kinds of engagement strategies 
these groups adopt in advancing their respective agendas. This section also discusses whether 
regional institutions have played any role in fostering a regional civil society realm, and whether 
they have been structured to allow meaningful engagement with CSOs to improve the quality of 
regional governance. It is beyond the scope of the paper, however, to analyze systematically the 
actual  success  or  failure  of  civil  society  advocacy  in  Asia.  The  final  section  discusses  the 
implications of the discussion for designing regional institutions.  
 
 
2.   Civil Society in Asia: A Conceptual Exploration 
 
The analytical and practical relevance of the term ―civil society‖ to Asia has been challenged by 
those who point to its origins in Western philosophy. In fact, even western understandings of civil 
society  can  differ,  attesting  to  the  complexities  of  the  concept  and  the  difficulties  in  attaining 
consensus on its definition (O‘Byrne, 2005). Despite its roots in the classical period, it was only 
during the time of the European Enlightenment that civil society came to represent a ―social realm 
distinct from the state‖ (Lee, 2004: 2). For German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, civil 
society was the realm between family and state, where individuals are freely able to organize to 
pursue their diverse economic, social, and civic interests—and their respective approaches to the 
good life. However, Hegel also argued that it was only the state as the embodiment of peoples‘ 
general will that could ensure the civility of this diverse social realm from its inherent tendency to 
conflict and instability—thereby positing a dialectical relationship between civil society and a state 
that sought to tame the former‘s Hobbesian elements (Lee, 2004; O‘Byrne, 2005). Although early 
Marxist conceptions equated civil society with the economy, most contemporary writings on the 
subject accept that civil society is a realm outside markets (O‘Byrne, 2005).  
 
Despite this long history in political thought, it was the Eastern European experience of the 1980s 
that returned the notion of civil society to contemporary political theory, particularly in international 
relations. Eastern European citizens from the 1970s began to demand a space in which they could 
organize freely without interference from the communist party-state, entrenching the notion of civil 
society  as  an  autonomous  realm  of  self-organizing  individuals—distinct  from  the market  and  in 
opposition  to  the  state  (Lee,  2004).  This  particular  understanding  of  civil  society  and  the 
unsurprisingly antagonistic relationship between civil society and the state in Eastern Europe raised 
doubts about the concept‘s analytical and practical relevance to Asia. Civil society‘s involvement in 
Eastern Europe‘s tumultuous transition from communist to democratic rule also raised the specter 
of similar democratic uprisings in Asian countries considered authoritarian or less-than-democratic. 




2.1   Relevance to Asia 
 
More specifically, the analytical relevance to Asia of the civil society concept as an autonomous 
sphere of voluntary organization in search of the good life has been questioned on at least three 
grounds (Weiss, 2008): (i) blurred boundaries between what is ―public‖ or ―private‖ in Asia—where 4          |  Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 63 
 
in many parts of Asia the state actively plays a direct role in establishing civil society and/or in 
shaping  its  features;  (ii)  supposedly  distinctive  cultural  dispositions  in  Asia—particularly  in 
Confucian and Islamic societies—where conformity to prevailing social and religious orders and 
acceptance  of  paternalistic  rule  and  limitations  on  individual  rights—mean  civil  society  in  the 
western mould cannot exist;
4 and (iii) aside from voluntary associations, ascription based on religion 
and  ethnicity  abound  in  Asia,  where  an  organization‘s  ―membership  is  by  assent  rather  than 
consent‖ (Alagappa, 2004b: 34). For these reasons, what sometimes is regarded as civil society in 
Asia cannot meet the exacting definition of the term adopted by scholars of comparative politics 
such as Larry Diamond (1996: 228), for whom civil society is the  
 
realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, 
autonomous from the state and bound by a legal order of shared sets of values…an 
intermediary  entity  standing  between  the  private  sphere  and  the  state…and  not  only 
restricts state power but legitimates state authority when that authority is based on the 
rule of law. 
 
However, adherence to such strict definitional standards has given way since the 1990s to allow for 
some conceptual broadening, which in turn has permitted scholars to recognize the existence of a 
dynamic, often vibrant civil society in a variety of Asian political and cultural settings (Weiss, 2008).  
 
In line with this broadening concept, this study adopts Alagappa‘s more inclusive definition of civil 
society as  
 
a  distinct  public  sphere  of  organization,  communication  and  reflective  discourse,  and 
governance  among  individuals  and  groups  that  take  collective  action  deploying  civil 
means to influence the state and its policies but not capture state power, and whose 
activities are not motivated by profit (Alagappa, 2004a: 9).  
 
This understanding of civil society does not a priori exclude advocacy groups comprising private 
citizens that are nevertheless either formed by the state or allied to it, although not formally a part of 
the  state  apparatus.
5  Moreover,  Alagappa‘s  definition  allows  for  the  inclusion  of  ascriptive 
organizations such as ethnic, religious, and language groups, while his reference to the use of ―civil 
means‖ excludes those transnational groups of terrorists or other criminals that advocate violence 
even  though  these  ―elements  of  uncivil  society‖  as  Richard  Price  (2003:  580)  calls  them  may 
significantly  impact  order  and  governance.
6  Labor  unions,  although  sometimes  excluded  from 
definitions of civil society due to their ―self-serving‖ nature in securing the material interests of union 
members, have increasingly articulated their views and positions on broader social and political 
perspectives on the economy even if their primary concern is with employment issues (Spooner, 
2004).  Nevertheless,  their  employment focus  has  led  labor  groups  to advocate  on  broader  but 
cognate public policy issues such as trade liberalization, privatization, and migrant labor, to name a 
few. Therefore, in this paper labor groups are, included as part of civil society given the broader, 
―public goods‖ aims of many contemporary labor groups.  
 
Allowing for a broader conception of civil society draws attention to the inherent heterogeneity of 
this realm and raises questions about civil society‘s presumed progressive role in enhancing the 
                                                 
4  See Gelner (1994) and Chan (1997).  
5  Political parties, however, are not considered to be part of civil society. 
6  Many CSOs themselves eschew the use of violence to attain their goals. For instance, while Amnesty International 
defends  all  prisoners  against  violence  (torture,  executions),  the  group  excludes  from  its  cast  of  ―prisoners  of 
conscience‖ those who have advocated violence (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 15).  
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quality of governance and promoting democratic change. Empirical evidence reveals that not all 
CSOs  support  progressive  political  and  social  change  (Edwards,  2004;  Kiely,  2005),  while  civil 
society  itself  is  often  a  realm  of  inequalities,  power  struggles,  and  conflict  as  much  as  of 
cooperation  (Alagappa,  2004a).  In  Asia,  CSOs  have  variously  supported  authoritarian  regimes, 
religious,  and  ethnic  exclusions  as  well  as  neoliberal  forms  of  economic  organization  that  can 
undermine social bonds and entrench economic exclusions (Alagappa, 2004a). On the other hand, 
religious groups, particularly Islamic groups that are often believed to be inimical to civil society—
with  their  tendency  to  exclusive,  affective  memberships  and  traditionalist  orientations
7—have  at 
times supported open political systems and inclusive forms of governance (Weiss, 2008).  
 
The point is that although civil society in Asia may not always be truly independent of the state or 
act as a democratizing force and a driver of progressive political change, it nevertheless constitutes 
a valuable space ―for political engagement and transformation‖ (Weiss, 2008: 152). The impact of 
such activities on governance, whether it moves in a more progressive, inclusive, and socially just 
direction or whether governance becomes more exclusivist and inequitable is left open. The notion 
of civil society, therefore, offers analytical leverage in developing a deeper understanding of the 
nature of political change in domestic and international politics (Price, 2003). It also has practical 
and normative value. Many people and groups now commonly identify themselves as belonging to 
civil society as they seek to shape public policy on a range of issues while leaders and officials 
increasingly pay attention to the idea of civil society and to the groups that identify themselves as 
CSOs (Alagappa, 2004a). Indeed, civil society has become a valuable empowering framework for 
activists who find talk of the term‘s relevance to Asia worrying and misguided (Edwards, 2004).  
 
2.2   The State-Civil Society Relationship: Implications for Civil Society’s 
Governance Role 
 
Contemporary  understandings  of  civil  society  emphasize  the  positive  relationship  between  civil 
society  and  governance,  particularly  the  quality  of  democracy,  using  two  models.  The  neo-
Tocquevillean or social capital model understands civil society‘s role in enhancing democracy and 
the  quality  of  governance  by  instilling  in  people  the  democratic  civic  culture  of  tolerance, 
cooperation, solidarity, and a ―sense of shared responsibility‖ (Putnam, 1993: 89-90).
8 A healthy 
associational life generates social capital in the form of trust and reciprocity among small networks 
of people, paving the way for a more cooperative and progressive society. In this associational 
model, CSOs can act as allies or agents of the state (or of other authoritative actors), aiding them in 
discharging  their  responsibilities  to  society.  In  contrast,  the  neo-Gramscian  model  adopts  a 
conflictual view of civil society as a counter-hegemonic site from which groups struggle against 
prevailing values and rule that are seen as unjust, exclusivist or favoring the powerful. In this view, 
civil  society  becomes  a  necessary  countervailing  power  against  the  state  or  other  authority 
structures (Lee, 2004). In theorizing resistance and counter-hegemony in the field of International 
Political  Economy  (IPE),  the  neo-Gramscian  model  sees  civil  society  as  the  site  from  which 
challenges to the (neoliberal) capitalist order emerges.
9 Thus, although the definition of civil society 
                                                 
7  On this point, see Gellner (1994: 22). 
8  The neo-Tocquevillean model has its origins in the writings of Alexis de-Tocqueville on associational life in the 
United States in the 19
th Century.  
9  Neoliberalism is defined as a set of politico-economic ideas that emphasize the superiority of a self-regulating 
market  for  wealth  creation  and  distribution.  Specific  economic  policies  associated  with  neoliberalism  include 
liberalization, privatization, and deregulation, all aimed at minimizing the role of the state in the economy and 
allowing private decision-making to thrive, thereby unleashing efficiencies in allocation, production, and distribution. 
Commitments to employment, social equity, and social stability have been marginalized under neoliberalism in 
favor of competitiveness and market efficiency as central ends of governance. To its detractors, neoliberalism 6          |  Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 63 
 
excludes ‗for-profit‘ organizations such as business firms, it is nonetheless a realm that is intimately 
related to the economy and business.  
 
Both models of civil society have been criticized on a variety of grounds.
10 One of the more salient 
criticisms is the tendency to view the state-civil society relationship in ―either-or‖ terms. Either there 
is  a  zero-sum  or  conflictual  relationship  between  the  state  and  civil  society,  as  in  the  neo-
Gramscian model, or there is a complementary, positive relationship between the two institutional 
realms  as  in  the  neo-Tocquevillean  model.  While  it  is  true  that  civil  society  and  state  (or 
government)  may  confront  each  other  at  times,  the  two  are  usually  in  some  form  of  mutually 
dependent relationship. In democratic societies, the state provides the legal framework that permits 
civil society to exist and thrive as an autonomous realm of self-organizing individuals while civil 
society  legitimizes  state  authority.  This  is  why  the  neo-Tocquevillean  model  sees  the  liberal-
democratic state and civil society as complementary; it also explains why earlier notions of civil 
society were not regarded as applicable to Asia with its many authoritarian governments that limited 
or  prevented  private  citizens  from  voluntarily  organizing  themselves  to  pursue  various  public 
interest goals. Although we now acknowledge that a civil society realm can exist in non-democratic 
contexts as well, the existence of civil society in these settings more than ever depends on the 
state, whether in the form of an uneasy tolerance involving co-optation, manipulation, or penetration 
by the state of civil society or a more accommodative stance of the state toward CSOs (Alagappa, 
2004b).  
 
A second criticism of these two models lies in the presumption that civil society can easily achieve 
consensus on what the good society should look like. Although civil society enthusiasts writing in 
the neo-Gramscian tradition acknowledge that civil society is the site from which multiple points of 
opposition to the prevailing order emerge, there is less discussion on whether a single, counter-
hegemonic project is needed for any fundamental transformation in governance, and if so, how 
such a project might emerge from this sea of diverse opposition. In fact, the tendency is to celebrate 
the diversity of destabilizations to the prevailing order arising in civil society (see Falk, 2000). Thus, 
many scholars continue to understand civil society simply as an ethical space that acts as a check 
on state power and a site for emancipatory politics (see O‘Byrne, 2005). However, this does not tell 
us precisely how CSOs achieve shifts in governance regimes—in rules and policies—toward some 
desired end, and indeed, how civil society reaches a consensus on precisely what that end might 
be. It is for this reason that Alagappa‘s definition emphasizes civil society as a realm in which 
―communication and reflective discourse‖ takes place. It is only when argument and deliberation 
openly  takes  place  amongst  the  diverse  components  of  civil  society—the  public  sphere 
phenomenon of civil society—that some reasoned (i.e., civil) consensus will be reached on the 
contours of a good society (Edwards, 2004). Social capital theorists, on the other hand, believe that 
social capital may be destroyed rather than built up by advocacy groups and mass organizations. 
This line of thinking, unfortunately, imposes an a priori conception of civil society as a source of a 
particular form of social capital built up through small group interaction that embraces inclusiveness 
and easily facilitates democracy and open, participatory politics. As one study on civil society and 
political  change  in  Asia  reveals,  these  forms  of  small  group  associations  can  act  in  ways  that 
deviate from these normative ideals (Alagappa, 2004e).  
Even at the transnational (global or regional) level, there exists a tendency to see transnational civil 
society and the nation-state (or authority) in binary terms, with the former as good and the state and 
                                                                                                                                                             
simply represents ―market fundamentalism‖ (Stiglitz, 2002). However, a neoliberal governance regime may be said 
to exist even if there is significant state intervention in markets if an activist state seeks to inculcate its population 
with  the  ethics  of  individual  responsibility,  initiative,  hard  work,  and  self-reliance,  considered  hallmarks  of  the 
neoliberal philosophy of governing populations (Lemke, 2001). 
10  Alagappa (2004b &c) and Lee (2004) review these criticisms in some detail.  
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associated state-based identities and priorities as bad (Kiely, 2005). Thus, global civil society has 
been portrayed as an unmitigated good, a corrective to the defective and/or the neoliberal capitalist 
state  as  well  as  to  exclusionary  nationalist  identities.  However,  Kiely  (2005)  not  only  cautions 
against presuming that all forms of CSOs are progressive, he also reminds us that transnational 
civil society cannot replace the politics of place and of belonging. National politics is often the focus 
of CSOs that operate regionally or globally, with civil society beyond the state as one additional 
space through which to advance some common cause. As with civil society within states, theorizing 
civil  society  beyond  the  boundaries  of  individual  states  requires  that  attention  is  paid  to  the 
changing relations between state and society, because it is states that shape and condition the 
space within which CSOs operate, both nationally as well as beyond. However, inter-state relations 
and  regional  institutional  frameworks  are  also  vital  when  considering  how  CSOs  operate  in 
transnational  regional  space.  In  the  context  of  this  paper,  this  means  asking  whether  state-
dominated regional organizations like ASEAN—in which a strong sovereignty/non-interference logic 
operates—will  be  able  to  deviate  from  the  preferences  of  those  member  states  unwilling  to 
countenance a larger role for CSOs in regional governance, or whether the regional institutional 
level offers the opportunity for a more accommodating form of response to civil society to develop in 
the region despite the anti-CSO predilection of some member states.  
 
Government responses to CSOs clearly depend on the nature of the political regime, and most 
studies of the civil society phenomenon have emphasized this variable in their studies. It is usually 
the more democratic states that are more hospitable to civil society groups engaging in activities 
that have a critical component to them and that have the potential to undermine elite power. In 
these political settings, governments tend to accommodate the range of activities common to civil 
society, including the articulation of new knowledge, especially alternate forms of knowledge that 
could  destabilize  prevailing  governance  arrangements,  and  even  demonstrations  and  mass 
protests.  In  other  political  settings,  CSOs  are  likely  to  find  themselves  confined  to  delivering 
services to the poor and other needy groups in society, often in partnership with the state. In this 
way, civil society enhances the power and capacity of the state to penetrate society and enhance 
the state‘s legitimacy. The Singapore government, for instance, has at one time, employed the term 
―civic  society‖  rather  than  civil  society  to  refer  to  its  preferred  model  of  voluntary  self-help 
associations working with the state to address the welfare needs of society (Koh and Ooi, 2004). In 
fact,  the  state-civil  society  relation  is  best  seen  as  a  dynamic  one.  Not  only  does  the  state‘s 
response to civil society change along with broader changes in internal politics, state capacity, and 
external trends, but CSOs themselves have adopted a range of creative strategies for negotiating 
with the state while still attempting to remain true to their normative ideals, group interests, and 
independence (Lee, 2004; Curley, 2007).  
 
2.3   A Mixed Model: Civil Society Advocacy Networks as Strategic Actors  
 
Keck and Sikkink‘s model of advocacy networks focuses on the resources and strategies that CSOs 
use to persuade, pressure, and even coerce authoritative actors to review existing norms, policies, 
and institutions in the public interest (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). This model offers two advantages 
over  the  social  capital  and  resistance  models.  First,  the  advocacy  network  model  offers  us  an 
agent-centric  account  of  how  CSOs—working  as  activists  within  or  across  territorial  borders—
exercise  agency  through  employing  a  variety  of  strategies  and  resources  in  their  attempts  to 
change key aspects of national, regional, and global governance.
11 Second, the advocacy network 
model does not preclude CSOs from allying with the state or some other authoritative actor on 
common issues, often aiding these actors to accomplish their tasks. Advocacy is not always about 
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challenging those exercising authority; rather, it is as much about informing authorities about some 
problem not yet visible to policymakers as about contesting the claims, positions, and policies of 
authoritative actors. Both collaboration and resistance, therefore, may be features of civil society 
advocacy networks, with these processes sometimes occurring in stages. CSOs first advocate on 
(or contest) some issue—successfully—and then work with states or regional/global institutions to 
implement the solutions adopted for that issue. In the advocacy network model, CSOs network not 
only with other CSOs, but with a variety of other actors ranging from philanthropic foundations, local 
community groups, media organizations, churches and other religious groups, research institutes 
and universities, local and national governments, as well as regional and global institutions (Keck 
and Sikkink, 1998).  
 
How do these multi-actor networks achieve change? Communication, persuasion, and pressure—
based on the information and knowledge generated by CSOs—are core strategies. Information and 
knowledge are vital for civil society, not only to build coalitions or alliances with powerful actors but 
importantly, to ―mobilize their own members and affect public opinion via the media‖ (ibid: 23). Civil 
society actors become influential in governance through their capacity to provide alternate sources 
of information and perspective on some phenomenon. By publicly reporting data and empirical facts 
not commonly available to policy makers on some issue or that challenge policymakers‘ version of 
these issues (e.g. environmental consequences of logging), CSOs are able to frame these issues or 
activities as problems requiring solutions. In 1987, research conducted by the Japan Tropical Forest 
Action Network (JATAN) on logging in Sarawak and its adverse impact on local communities helped 
end a road construction project in the logging area that had been promised funding by the Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) (Keck and Sikkink, 1998).  
 
In their advocacy work, CSOs often adopt particular kinds of language to dramatize or moralize a 
problem to convince the public and policymakers to shift their thinking on the issue and ultimately to 
develop solutions. Discursively depicting the act of patenting HIV/AIDS medicines as ―death through 
greed,‖ despite the legality of patents under WTO rules, allowed the NGO Access Campaign to shift 
public opinion, particularly in the US, against pharmaceutical companies and helped bring about a 
change in the way WTO rules on intellectual property rights will be applied during public health 
crises (Sell and Prakash, 2004). CSOs also aid the cause of governance by articulating new causal 
or principled ideas that help make connections between trends that were previously perceived to be 
unrelated or negatively related (e.g. showing the positive link between competitiveness/productivity 
and core labor standards) or that provide different normative perspectives on the phenomenon in 
question. By identifying different causal relationships from those found in prevailing governance 
arrangements,  CSOs  aim  to  offer  alternative  models  of  governance  that  are  more  inclusive  of 
marginalized  sectors  like  the  environment  or  groups  like  workers,  migrant  labor  or  indigenous 
communities.  
 
This does not mean that CSOs do not mobilize other forms of material resources in attaining their 
goals; mass protests and consumer boycotts that inflict material damage on their targets have been 
successfully  employed  by  advocacy  networks  in  a  variety  of  issue  areas  ranging from  logging, 
human rights, dam construction, palm oil cultivation, and whaling, to name a few. However, even 
the success of these strategies are fundamentally rooted in discursive activities—the reporting and 
framing of information and ideas in ways that draw public attention to an issue or problem, thereby 
pressuring  policymakers  to  respond  in  one  or  another  way.  These  kinds  of  information-based 
strategies also govern how these networks engage with their ―targets‖ such as states, international 
institutions and private sector actors. Engagement can involve not just reasoning with these targets, 
it often involves ―bringing pressure, arm-twisting, encouraging sanctions, and shaming‖ (Keck and 
Sikkink, 1998).  
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2.4   Civil Society and its Impact on the Quality of Governance 
 
It is not always easy to establish precisely the extent to which CSOs have reformed or transformed 
governance. There are difficulties in disentangling the different contributions to such changes from 
civil society and other actors on the global political stage as well as the role often played by unique 
historical junctures and political opportunity to act (Scholte, 2002). Nevertheless, it is possible to 
identify in broad terms five outcomes of civil society activity in relation to governance arrangements: 
(i) discursive shifts; (ii) agenda setting, including raising new issues; (iii) changes to institutional 
processes; (iv) policy changes; and v) shifts in actor behaviour (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Scholte, 
2002). Not all civil society activism attains all of these outcomes; but, achieving any one of these 
may be significant, particularly as it could have a knock-on effect on other aspects of governance 
(Keck and Sikkink, 1998).  
 
Shifts in the prevailing discourse are among the most significant outcomes of CSO activity. This is 
because discourse is not merely language and rhetoric; discourse is productive in that it shapes the 
social  meaning  structures  within  which  we  operate,  in  turn  altering  incentives  and  constraints 
operating  on  states  and  other  authority  figures.  Norms  of  good  governance,  human  rights, 
sustainable development, and human security are among the new notions that have become widely 
circulated in world politics through advocacy activities of CSOs. Although these new norms are not 
uncontested, they have altered the way states, international organizations,  and  the  public  think 
about and even practice governance; these new norms are now part of the governance framework 
even if they do not go unchallenged (Scholte, 2002). Indeed, a good deal of the contemporary 
politics of governance involves contestations over these new norms and the changes in policies and 
behaviour expected as a result.  
 
In turn, agendas may be reformed as a result of these new norms, which also permit the creation of 
new issues as legitimate tasks of governance as well as new institutions. The emergence of a 
human rights discourse in world politics legitimized the advocacy work of human rights activists, 
including the monitoring and reporting of official abuses against citizens (Barnett and Duvall, 2005). 
The evolution of the human rights agenda in ASEAN regional governance is a notable case-in-point 
of how discursive shifts can lead to real changes, albeit over a prolonged period. Although ASEAN 
states  rejected  the  western  concept  of  human  rights  in  the  early  1990s  by  emphasizing  the 
superiority  of  a  regional  concept,  this  ―regionalizing‖  paradoxically  compelled  states  to 
acknowledge, or at least tolerate, the subsequent emergence of national and regional human rights 
advocacy groups and networks whose work, over time, led to the formation of the ASEAN Inter-
governmental Commission on Human Rights in 2008. In this case, regional civil society advocacy 
helped form a new institutional structure on this issue, albeit a weak one (Nesadurai, 2009). CSO 
advocacy  has  also  led  to  the  reform  of  existing  institutions. The  formal  integration  of  CSOs  in 
institutional processes in the World Bank and ADB are cases in point; these institutions now allow 
for the participation of civil society groups in their activities. Shifts in policies are another valuable 
outcome of CSO advocacy although policy changes may not always be implemented. Ultimately, it 
is change in actual behaviour by states and other authoritative actors that is crucial in reforming 
governance such that there is a discernible change in people‘s lives. 
 
To assess the impact of civil society on the quality of governance, we also need to consider the 
extent to which CSO activity enhances the effectiveness of governance institutions as well as the 
accountability  of  these  institutions  to  stakeholders.  Institutional  effectiveness  may  be  linked  to 
substantive  targets;  effectiveness  is  enhanced  if  CSO  activity  helps  institutions  review  goals, 
introduce new agenda items, as well as consider new ways of addressing problems and revise 
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achieving these substantive targets, the information and knowledge producing role of CSOs is vital 
in ways that have already been discussed. A second dimension of governance quality—enhancing 
institutional  accountability—relates  to  matters  of  procedural  justice  and  the  legitimacy  of 
governance institutions. Accountability is about assuming responsibility for one‘s actions. In fact, it 
is  from  the  notion  of  accountability  that  other  measures  of  good  governance,  especially  of 
democratic governance, emerge—representation and transparency being the two most significant 
(Caporaso,  2003).  Two  other  measures  of  accountability  are  how  an  institution  responds  to 
complaints made against it and whether the institution has an effective evaluation process for its 
policies  and  programs.
12  Previously,  only  limited  notions  of  accountability  were  in  place  as 
international institutions saw their primary responsibility to their founding member states, their core 
funders, or  less often, the  entire membership  of that institution. It was to these states that the 
institution had to justify its policies and actions. In the contemporary world order, with growing public 
concern  over  the  accountability  gap  and  democratic  deficit  of  many  international  institutions, 
accountability to a wider cast of actors beyond this core group has become crucial to legitimizing 
governance arrangements beyond the state. 
 
If institutional accountability is about acknowledging and assuming responsibility for the institutions‘ 
actions  to  all  its  key  stakeholders,  then  there  must  be  some  mechanism  that  allows  these 
stakeholders to be consulted. Representation can take two forms. One mode of representation 
involves  the  actual  physical  representation  by  CSOs  of  that  institution‘s  multiple  stakeholders, 
namely  those  communities  or  groups  affected  by  some  activity  of  the  institution  in  question. A 
second notion of representation is that of ―discursive representation‖ where civil society participants 
―represent positions rather than populations, ideas rather than constituencies‖ (Keck, 2004: 45). 
Adopting the notion of discursive representation helps to address the oft-made criticism that CSOs 
are not truly representative of the constituencies they claim to represent; it should help us resist 
moves to exclude civil society from meaningful participation in governance institutions on these 
grounds.  Transparency  is  another  key  component  of  accountability.  If  an  institution‘s  actions, 
agendas,  deliberations,  and  decisions  are  closed,  it  is  impossible for  that  institution to  assume 
responsibility for its activities to its stakeholders. Again, CSOs can play a role in this regard by not 
only acting as a conduit through which information is conveyed between the institution and key 
stakeholders,  but  also  as  a  ―processing  center‖  that  analyses,  interprets,  and  evaluates  the 
information  provided,  challenges  it  if  necessary,  and  through  that  process  helps  create  better 
outcomes for those affected by the activities of the institution. Complaints lodged by CSOs or by 
local communities affected by the projects and policies of an institution may be considered to be 
one more type of independent information that will aid the institution in question to better evaluate 
its own policies and programs, as well as formal internal and independent evaluation mechanisms.  
 
While such accountability practices involving non-elite CSOs are increasingly common in global 
institutions as well as institutions in the European Union, their role in Asia remains limited. Although 
regional  institutions  accord  a  significant  institutional  role  to  elite  CSOs  such  as  the  regional 
scholarly  networks  of  academics,  other  researchers,  and  business  associations,  many  regional 
institutions have not tapped non-elite civil society‘s potential to enhance institutional effectiveness 
and  accountability.  Since  institutional  effectiveness  and  accountability  depend  on  having  ―more 
outside  checks  on  information‖  as  well  as  ―more  independent  information‖  (Haggard,  2010:  5), 
CSOs are one category of international actor to which such responsibilities may be delegated in 
international institutions.
13 The paper returns to this point in Section 5. 
 
                                                 
12  These are the four measures of accountability used by One World Trust to compile its annual Global Accountability 
Report. See One World Trust (2007 & 2008). 
13  On the delegation of various tasks in regional institutions, see Haggard (2009).  
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3.   Civil Society in Asia: Negotiating the State  
 
A number of studies have documented the existence of a vibrant civil society realm in Asia once we 
relax the strict definition of the term and allow for some conceptual broadening as discussed in the 
previous section.  These studies  have also documented an  expansion in the numbers of CSOs 
operating across Asia, particularly since the 1980s (Yamamoto, 1995; Schak and Hudson, 2003; 
Alagappa, 2004e; Lee, 2004).
14 Alagappa‘s study of civil society is perhaps the most ambitious for 
its scope, covering 12 diverse countries across Asia, and for its theoretical coherence, thereby 
contributing to building theory on the nature and transformative role of civil society operating in a 
variety of political settings beyond the western, liberal-democratic state.  
 
It is in those Asian states that witnessed political liberalization and democratization that we see the 
sharpest spike in CSO growth as governments became committed to creating and safeguarding a 
space for non-state groups. This was the experience in Republic of Korea (Korea); Taipei,China; 
Thailand;  Philippines;  and  Indonesia  following  political  liberalization  and  democratic  transition—
especially as CSOs previously operating underground formalized operations in the new political 
environment  (Alagappa,  2004c).  However,  even  in  these  new  Asian  democracies,  the  legal 
framework guaranteeing civil society a space in which to operate unhindered continues to be limited 
by laws left over from their authoritarian past (Alagappa, 2004c). CSOs have also sprung up ‖from 
below‖ as a result of disaffection with national governments in many parts of Asia. Dissatisfaction 
with  official  government  policies,  particularly  those  relating  to minorities,  has  sparked  non-state 
oppositional  and  advocacy  groups  to  organize.  This  has  been  the  experience  in  Malaysia,  Sri 
Lanka, and the Philippines, which are grappling with the issue of minority rights (Alagappa, 2004c). 
Even in democracies like India and the Philippines, CSOs have emerged to provide the goods and 
services that national and/or local governments seem unable or unwilling to deliver to needy and 
vulnerable communities. CSO activity has also grown in response to the adverse consequences of 
rapid economic growth and industrialization (Polet, 2007). This has given rise to the emergence of 
new issues around which groups have coalesced, namely labor rights, environmental degradation, 
economic justice, corporate governance, crony capitalism and corruption (Alagappa, 2004c). Labor 
advocacy has, in fact, grown in settings across the political spectrum as workers confront the social 
consequences  of  neoliberal  policies  that  have  undermined  traditional  employment  and  wage 
safeguards and increased the insecurities workers face in a highly competitive, globalizing world 
economy (Spooner, 2004). 
  
Although CSOs operate in a range of political settings in Asia, it is in the more open and democratic 
countries that we see a spectrum of CSO activity, from advocacy—including protests and rallies—to 
the production of critical/alternative knowledge and service delivery. Pluralism is the result. In these 
states,  CSO  activity  also  helps  sustain  the  democratic  order.  However,  in  formally  democratic 
countries—such as Malaysia and Sri Lanka—many CSOs have organized along communal (ethnic 
or religious) lines, and, in some instances have contracted democratic space and limited moves 
toward genuine openness and pluralism (Weiss, 2004; Devotta, 2004). In more authoritarian or 
repressive regimes, governments have chosen to deliberately encourage the growth of CSOs allied 
with the state, both to counter oppositional or independent CSOs and to work with the government 
on a variety of development projects (Alagappa, 2004; Curley, 2007). Thus, while CSO activity has 
grown in countries like the PRC and Myanmar, many advocacy activities tend to be suppressed, 
though not always successfully. Even in more stringent political settings, CSOs have attempted to 
find ways to negotiate with the state. In the PRC for instance, state-controlled organizations have 
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managed to slip out from under state control and have become agents for the ―expression of ideals, 
or mobilization and coordination against the party-state‖ (Ding, 1994: 32). A similar experience has 
been reported in the case of Viet Nam, where individuals and groups have managed to creatively 
adapt to their highly restrictive milieu, including using their connections with communist officialdom 
or their knowledge of the system in order to challenge it from within, in what Russell Heng (2004: 
157) has termed ―system-subverting politics.‖  
 
The picture of CSO activity in Asia is thus highly varied as domestic regime type, state capacity, 
and the nature of state-society relations combine to shape the nature and form that civil society 
takes within national settings. In addition, developments at the international, structural level have 
also facilitated the growth of civil society in Asia. In particular, the end of  communism and the 
triumph of liberal democracy and liberal capitalism led major powers like the United States and the 
European Union to champion liberal norms of human rights and democracy as universal norms. 
This  necessarily  entailed  supporting  the  development  of  civil  society,  which  translated  into  the 
availability of considerable material resources for Asian CSOs as well as a moral framework that 
legitimized their existence. Many illiberal governments chose to tolerate CSO activity, albeit in a 
highly controlled manner, because they not only recognized the value of these groups in alleviating 
the burdens of the state in addressing a range of social and developmental issues, but because of 
concern  that  they  would  be  pressured  to  adopt  new  international  norms  of  human  rights  and 
democracy  through  external  political  pressure  and  other  forms  of  conditionality.  At  least,  the 
presence of CSOs gives the impression that a more open political system is in place, even if the 




Yet,  as  the  Asian  experience  shows,  CSOs  operating  in  such  constrained  environments  have 
managed  to  work  through  the  state  in  advancing  their  respective  causes.  Nevertheless,  their 
success is limited by the kinds of issues that CSOs can advocate. Issues that directly pose a threat 
to ruling governments and prevailing political systems are usually out-of-bounds. While CSOs may 
be  able  to  organize  against  issues  that  touch  on  politics  or  government  performance  such  as 
corruption and governmental inefficiency, they can only do so to the extent that these advocacy 
activities do not challenge the authority and legitimacy of the ruling regime. Nevertheless, even in 
these settings, the advent of new information and communication technologies (ICT) has allowed 
CSOs  to  use  cyberspace  as  a  realm  to  ―escape‖  repression,  and  silencing.  This  has  not  only 
happened in Myamar and the PRC but CSOs have also used cyberspace to articulate criticisms of 
the  political  system,  the  government  and  its  policies  and  practices  in  Singapore  and  Malaysia 
(Alagappa, 2004c). In fact, ICT has promoted networking of CSOs across borders and facilitated 
the emergence of a transnational, regional civil society space. Burmese groups operating in exile 
such  as  the  Free  Burma  Coalition  have  established  a  network  of  human  rights  and  student 
organizations in 28 Asian and European countries to press for political change. This network has 
successfully persuaded some multinational corporations against doing business with the Myanmar 
military government (Kyaw, 2004).  
 
The growing links between local CSOs in Asia with global CSOs, including through local chapters or 
regional offices of global NGOs like Amnesty International, Transparency International, OXFAM, 
Freshwater Action Network (FAN), and the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF), to name a few, has 
also  empowered  many  local  CSOs,  especially  through  material,  information,  and  knowledge 
resources that the more established global partner makes available to the local CSO to aid the 
latter in its advocacy. But, the flow of ideas is not always from the global to the local; local CSOs 
                                                 
15  In Manor‘s typology, centralised governments tend to be suspicious of independent power centres, preferring top-
down institutions that are controlled by the state. Manor, cited in Curley (2007: 187-89).  
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have  provided  innovative  approaches  to  local  problems  that  international  organizations  then 
replicate or adapt. A case in point  is the program of non-formal education for working children 
initiated  in  the  early  1980s  by  a  local  Bangladeshi  NGO,  the  Bangladesh  Rural  Advancement 
Committee (BRAC) that formed the basis for a similar program launched in the late 1980s by the 
United Nations Children‘s Fund (UNICEF) for the Bangladesh government (Yusuf, 2006). In this 
case,  BRAC  recognized  the  reality  of  working  children  in  Bangladesh,  and  consequently 
spearheaded a practical alternative that later informed the programs of an international agency. 
Nevertheless, global-local linkages can have their downside if local CSOs become dependent on, 
and are seen to be uncritically adopting the analyses and interpretation of local issues that use 
culturally different lenses. In such instances, it becomes easier for governments to delegitimize 
local CSOs by accusing them of being western pawns.  
 
Nevertheless, despite these caveats, CSOs that may be restricted within national space are able to 
enlarge their capacity to act by exploiting both cyberspace and the transnational space above the 
state—both global and regional. As the next section shows, CSOs in Asia have used the regional 
level in which to organize and press for change on a variety of issues through both networking 
among themselves as well as engaging with regional institutions.  
 
 
4.   Civil Society and Regional Institutions in East Asia 
 
The  regional  institutional  landscape  in  Asia  is  undoubtedly  complex,  shaped  by  a  variety  of 
institutional  arrangements  aimed  at  addressing  a  growing  array  of  domestic,  transnational,  and 
global issues and problems. These different arrangements may be categorized into at least five 
institutional types although some of these arrangements are difficult to slot into one or another of 
these categories.  
 
The  most  visible  of  these  arrangements  are  the  traditional  state-centric,  inter-governmental 
organizations (IGOs) with broad agendas. Examples include the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations  (ASEAN),  Asia-Pacific  Economic  Cooperation  (APEC),  ASEAN  Plus  Three  (APT),  the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the 
Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), the 
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the South Pacific Forum (SPF). Asia is also host to 
functionally narrower arrangements that bring together specialized government regulatory agencies 
networking with similar bodies in other states—sometimes with international regulatory bodies to 
share information and to cooperate over very specific items that fall within the respective purview of 
these functional agencies. Examples of these trans-governmental networks
16 include the regional 
central bankers‘ network, Executives‘ Meeting of East Asia-Pacific Central Banks (EMEAP) as well 
as the ASEANAPOL network of Chiefs of ASEAN police forces.
17 Even members of parliaments 
now network regularly  across national borders such as through the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary 
Assembly  (AIPA)  and  in  South  Asia  through  the  Association  of  SAARC  Speakers  and 
Parliamentarians. A third institutional category is the subregional arrangement aimed at enhancing 
cooperation  amongst  smaller  subregions  within  nation-states,  for  instance,  Greater  Mekong 
Subregion Economic Cooperation Program (GMS), Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines—East  ASEAN  Growth  Area  (BIMP-EAGA),  and  Central  Asian  Regional  Economic 
                                                 
16  For  a  discussion  on  the  worldwide  growth  of  networks  of  regulators  interacting  across  national  borders,  see 
Slaughter (2005).  
17  EMEAP sometimes works closely with the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) while ASEANAPOL cooperates 
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Cooperation (CAREC).
18 In addition to these more formalized governance structures are those that 
are still state-centric but are looser arrangements that function more like dialogues—the Six Party 
Talks  between  the  United  States,  Japan,  People‘s  Republic  of  China,  Republic  of  Korea, 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), and the Russian Federation aimed at addressing 
the DPRK nuclear issue, the East Asia Summit with its wide-ranging agenda, and the inter-regional 
Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), also with a broad agenda. The Shangri-La Dialogue (more formally 
known  as  the  Asia  Security  Summit)—which  brings  together  defense  ministers,  senior  military 
figures, and other non-military officials from within Asia and from outside the region—is convened 
by a London-based think-tank, the International Institute of Strategic Studies.
19 
 
Aside from these four types of state-centric arrangements, Asia is also home to an array of non-
state regional networks that also aim to contribute to regional governance. These networks usually 
comprise scholars from think tanks and universities as well as business persons from the private 
sector. Regional scholarly networks include ASEAN-ISIS, the Network of East Asian Think-Tanks 
(NEAT), CSCAP, PECC and the Consortium of Non-Traditional Security Studies in Asia (NTS-Asia) 
that includes members from South Asia, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, and even Australia, joined 
by  a  shared  commitment  to  non-traditional  approaches  to  security  problems.  Private  sector 
networks, often closely linked to regional institutions, include the APEC Business Advisory Council, 
the ASEAN Business Forum, the SAARC Chambers of Commerce and Industry (SAARC-CCI), the 
GMS  Business  Forum,  and  the  CAREC  Business  Development  Forum.  The  Roundtable  on 
Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), a global private sector initiative  that includes the participation of 
NGOs and aimed at ensuring that palm oil is produced in a sustainable manner, should also be 
considered  a  key  component  of  the  regional  institutional  architecture  for  governance.  This  is 
because of the central role of the RSPO in certifying the ethical and ―green‖ credentials of the palm 
oil industry, a significant economic sector in Malaysia and Indonesia, which supplies about 84% of 
the global output of palm oil. It is also a growing industry elsewhere in Asia in which Malaysian palm 
oil companies, already accused of ecologically unsustainable and unethical practices, dominate. 
The  RSPO  is,  therefore,  a  key  framework  for  governing  business  and  state  practices  in  this 
industry.  
 
Although this is not an exhaustive list of regional institutional arrangements in Asia, it is a brief 
introduction that serves to highlight a key feature of the Asian regional institutional architecture— it 
is a complex structure of diverse, often over-lapping governance arrangements that operate at sub-
national,  national,  subregional,  regional,  and  inter-regional  levels,  even  involving  non-state 
governance arrangements and addressing a wide array of problems and issues (Jayasuriya, 2009; 
Caballero-Anthony,  2009).  Moreover,  many  of  these  regional  institutional  arrangements  often 
involve participation of multilateral institutions like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, 
Bank for International Settlements, and ADB, either on a regular or ad hoc basis (Jayasuriya, 2008). 
But  it is in East  Asia that we see the region‘s reputed institutional  diversity—as multiple,  often 
competing and overlapping institutional  arrangements—formed to cater to the  various economic 
and political interests of a set of heterogeneous countries.
20 Often, these institutional arrangements 
are supplemented by a plethora of agreements, including free trade area and economic partnership 
agreements, codes of conduct (such as on the South China Sea), as well as a host of other specific 
initiatives and projects (such as the Chiang Mai Initiative  Multilateralization and the Asian Bond 
Markets  Initiative,  both aimed  at  enhancing  regional  financial  governance,  as  well  as  ASEAN‘s 
                                                 
18  Membership  details  of  these  various  subregional  schemes  are  available  from  the  ADB  website, 
www.adb.org/Countries/subregional.asp 
19  Countries that have participated in the annual Dialogues since 2002 are listed at  the website of the Dialogue‘s 
convener at www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2008/participating-countries/. 
20  On this point, see Haggard (2009) and Ravenhill (2009).  
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tripartite Community building project). These further contribute to the structures and processes of 
regional governance.  
 
Paralleling the growth of regional institutions is a growing regional civil society space in Asia in 
which a variety of CSOs participate using different strategies to advance a wide range of causes. 
Although it is impossible to map the entire spectrum of causes advocated by CSOs, regional civil 
society activism tends to address issues within the following broad categories: (i) economic rights 
and exclusions, including those related to labor and land rights; (ii) political change, democratization 
and  human  rights;  (iii)  sustainable  development  and  environmental  causes;  (iv)  gender  issues; 
(v) poverty, development, trade and globalization; (vi) the adverse social consequences of regional 
liberalization and integration arrangements, including bilateral FTAs; and (vii) human security. While 
regional networking among CSOs had been going on since at least the late 1970s, the region‘s 
complex  institutional  architecture  also  acts  as  a  spur  to  regional  activism,  both  when  CSOs 
advocate against the activities of one or more of these regional institutions as well as when they 
use them as a(nother) channel through which to be heard by policymakers. 
 
As the discussion to follow shows, regional CSO activity falls into the following broad categories: 
(i) regional advocacy activities, including through regional CSO networks; (ii) parallel summitry, both 
with and without official sanction; and (iii) CSO partnerships with states and regional institutions in 
specific projects including delivering services to vulnerable communities. It is important to keep in 
mind that these are not mutually exclusive, with CSOs engaging in more than one of these activity 
types.  Moreover, some of these activities  derive from others; for instance, regional advocacy—
persuading and challenging officials to change their position on some issue—could eventually lead 
to state-CSO partnerships in implementing the revised policy. While a regional civil society is clearly 
in place, whether this  has been matched by a definite and sustained move toward  institutional 
engagement  with  civil  society  actors  in  ways  that  enhance  institutional  effectiveness  and 
accountability is a question that needs to be considered more carefully. We will return to this in the 
concluding section. 
 
4.1   Regional Advocacy and Transnational Civil Society Networks  
 
Advocacy—where CSOs attempt to argue in favor of a particular issue or group—have a fairly long 
history in Asia, even before the emergence of the dense regional institutional environment in the 
1990s.  Aside  from  advocacy  undertaken  by  individual  CSOs  acting  independently,  like-minded 
CSOs increasingly collaborate to advance shared causes. While an exhaustive survey is beyond 
the scope of this paper, it is possible to identify a few core approaches to regional CSO advocacy. 
Advocacy  is  most  commonly  understood  to  involve  speaking  or  writing  on  behalf  of  some 
marginalized cause or group; in short, to plead their case. At one end of the spectrum, mobilization 
of the masses through rallies and protests is a form of advocacy, often undertaken to demonstrate 
solidarity with the affected group and to make a visible statement about the cause. A more common 
approach to advocacy is to use information and knowledge to provide fresh perspectives on existing 
or new problems and—through such knowledge and research-centered lobbying—aim for change. 
 
Although mass protests  do not always elicit positive responses from governments  in Asia, one 
mass protest campaign that did lead to positive change was that mobilized by CSOs against the 
ADB  in  May  2000.  According  to  an  ADB  official,  this  protest  rally  compelled  ADB  to  seriously 
consider the demands of ordinary people over two key ADB projects in Thailand—the privatization 
of social services such as schools and hospitals, and the Samut Prakarn Wastewater Management 
Project  that  had  been  challenged  by  the  Long  Dan  villagers  in  Samut  Prakarn  for  being 
environmentally unsound and corrupt (Tadem, 2007). Like many other regional advocacy activities 16          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 63 
 
and mass protests, this campaign linked regional CSOs with those from other parts of the world 
acting  in  solidarity  with  local  Thai  groups  and  communities  in  lobbying  ADB  as  well  as  other 
interested governments, especially those providing funds to these projects. ADB‘s responsiveness 
to this particular advocacy campaign was likely to have been shaped by the prevailing atmosphere 
of the ―post-Seattle‖ period when multilateral institutions like the IMF, World Bank, and WTO came 
under considerable global pressure to demonstrate accountability to local communities affected by 
their rules and projects. In February 2001, ADB established the NGO and Civil Society Center to 




Most major Asian CSOs that focus on transnational, regional, or global issues emphasize research 
as a key resource for their advocacy work; by articulating alternate knowledge paradigms, CSOs 
aim to alter prevailing governance arrangements that badly affect various groups in society. FOCUS 
on  the  Global  South  (FOCUS),  for  instance,  engages  in  individual  advocacy  work,  especially 
through research and position papers on mostly economic matters, mobilizing against globalization 
more generally, and on the WTO and other global institutions in particular. FOCUS has also been 
critical of ASEAN‘s approach to national and regional liberalization and economic integration, which 
it says is overwhelmingly aligned to corporate needs. Its global focus allows the research work and 
findings of FOCUS to be used by CSOs operating in a variety of subregional spaces. Other CSOs 
like the Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA) and Alternate ASEAN 
(ALT-ASEAN) focus advocacy on political issues, especially human rights abuses in Myanmar and 
other Asian countries as well as anti-democratic practices of a number of governments in the region 
(Lizee, 2000; Acharya, 2003).  
 
Aside from individual advocacy, CSOs such as  FORUM-ASIA and FOCUS  also  join  other like-
minded CSOs to form ad hoc or more permanent regional advocacy networks. Both these CSOs 
are members of the steering committee of a key regional advocacy network, the Solidarity for Asian 
People‘s Advocacy (SAPA), which focuses its advocacy work on three Asian subregions—South 
Asia,  Southeast  Asia,  and  Northeast  Asia.  Formed  in  2006,  SAPA  has  become  a  fairly 
representative regional advocacy network—if we go by its broad-based agenda that addresses a 
range of concerns affecting Asian communities—and by its membership of about 100 national and 
regional CSOs. SAPA membership extends only to Asia‘s non-state organizations, including social 
movements, NGOs, and trade unions that are involved in some form of lobbying or advocacy aimed 
at international organizations.
22 Its annual regional consultations have involved from 30 CSOs (at its 
inaugural consultation) to 55 in 2007. Key advocacy themes include human rights and democracy; 
globalization, trade, finance and labor; sustainable development and environment; and peace and 
human security (SAPA, 2007). SAPA‘s main aim is to  
 
enhance  the  effectiveness  and  impact  of  civil  society  advocacy  by  improving 
communication,  cooperation  and  coordination  among  non-governmental  organizations 
operating regionally in the face of rapidly increasing and multiplying inter-governmental 
processes and meetings in Asia.
23 
 
Clearly, SAPA is aimed at advocacy and lobbying activities targeted at regional organizations. It 
also  undertakes  studies  on  issues  it  advocates.  SAPA  has  subregional  Working  Groups,  on 
                                                 
21  See the site, NGO and Civil Society Center at www.adb.org/NGOs/ngocenter.asp (accessed 13 November 2009). 
22  See SAPA website at www.asiasapa.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=12&Itemid=64 (accessed 
13 November 2009). 
23  Ibid.  
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Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia respectively, that each year prioritize a set of work programs 
that relate to the core agendas of the main regional organizations in each subregion. Thus, the 
Working Group on Southeast Asia in 2007 developed work programs on the ASEAN Charter and 
the ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism, among others, which were core items on the official ASEAN 
agenda during that period (SAPA, 2007).
24 While there is no formal regional organization as yet in 
Northeast  Asia,  the Working  Group  focuses  on  the  ASEAN  Plus  Three  Summit  as  well  as  on 
thematic priorities such as migration and on peace and security issues linked to militarization and 
the Democratic People‘s Republic of Korean nuclear issue (SAPA, 2007). In South Asia, rather than 
setting up a new Working Group, SAPA chose to work with an existing regional CSO network—
SANTI (South Asia Network Against Torture and Impunity)—established in Bangladesh to lobby 
SAARC. Aside from these subregional focal points, other thematic working groups in SAPA bring 
together civil society participants from all three subregions; these focus on migration and labor as 
well  as  human  rights  (SAPA,  2007).  However,  the  degree  to  which  SAPA-led  advocacy  has 
succeeded is open to question. For instance, the final form taken by the ASEAN Charter and the 
ASEAN Human Rights Mechanism clearly reflect largely official positions within ASEAN despite the 
best efforts of civil society groups like SAPA to lobby for a more progressive stance. We return to 
this point in Section 4.2. 
 
One regional advocacy network that has clearly not been successful is the regional labor network in 
Southeast Asia, which has focused its advocacy on altering regional (or national) approaches to 
labor. Part of the problem lies with the nature of trade unions in the region. Unions are usually the 
institutional form through which workers attempt to organize collectively to advance their position 
and interests. In Asia, these tend to be fragmented and beset by internal tensions, notwithstanding 
the rhetorical commitment to improving work conditions and employment practices within their firms 
or industry. Moreover, although these organizations subscribe to a social justice platform and call 
for a more humane form of globalization or a more socially just approach to global and regional 
economic governance, their ability to forge solidarity networks transnationally is undermined by the 
way different groups of workers, and by extension their unions, are differentially inserted into global 
and  regional  production  processes  (Cumbers  et  al,  2008). Workers  in  high-performing, globally 
integrated industries are likely to look more positively on regional integration and liberalization, for 
instance,  than  workers  in  sectors  that  compete  with  regional  and  global  firms.  Thus,  labor 
organizations are likely in the first instance to engage nationally with their respective governments 
or with their employers in seeking to enhance the position and interests of particular groups of 
workers.  Yet,  labor  groups  in  Southeast  Asia  have  come  together  in  a  transnational  regional 
network to articulate a regional agenda for labor and to advocate its inclusion as a dialogue partner 
in the region‘s integration framework.  
 
Working  through  the  ASEAN  Trade  Union  Council  (ATUC),  a  number  of  labor  groups  from 
Southeast  Asia  have  proposed  the  ASEAN  Social  Charter,  which  they  see  as  the  ―social 
counterpart to ASEAN‘s economic, trade and investment architecture …as a social pillar necessary 
to counteract the negative impacts of globalization on labor standards, distribution of income and 
social  protection‖  (ATUC,  nd).
25  The  Social  Charter  was  agreed  after  more  than  5  years  of 
consultations and negotiations, initially between national, regional (ATUC), and a global trade union 
(the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions-Asia Pacific Regional Office [ICFTU-APRO]). 
These meetings were spearheaded by the Singapore office of the German foundation, Friedrich 
Ebert Stiftung, which also organized a set of later consultations between labor unions, civil society 
groups, academics, and government officials. Labor groups chose to work collectively in Southeast 
                                                 
24  The latest available report is the 2007 Summary Report of the SAPA General Forum. 
25     http://www2.asetuc.org/media/5_0%20ASETUC%20and%20Civil%20Society%20in%20ASEAN_1.pdf 18          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 63 
 
Asia because of a growing, shared concern at the lack of  any social or labor standards in the 
ASEAN  Free  Trade  Agreement  (AFTA)  and  in  other  bilateral  trade  arrangements  involving 
Southeast Asian states and the ASEAN Economic Community project. In fact, the ASEAN Social 
Charter was initially conceived as the AFTA Social Charter, but was renamed the ASEAN Social 
Charter to demonstrate labor‘s support for the ASEAN regional process (Sperling and von Hoffman, 
2003). Labor groups initiated the Social Charter when ASEAN failed to include organized labor as a 
dialogue  partner  in  developing  AFTA  (Santiago,  2005).  In  drawing  up  the  Social  Charter,  the 
regional labor network drew on a set of principles and standards promulgated by the International 
Labor Organization (ILO): among others, these include the right to freely organize.  
 
As already noted, labor advocacy has not been too successful. ASEAN‘s adoption of the ASEAN 
Economic Community and the ASEAN Socio-cultural Community pillars in 2003 under its tripartite 
ASEAN Community project took place with little consultation with labor groups. Neither are workers‘ 
rights guaranteed or protected in these two programmes (Santiago, 2005). This is not surprising 
given the less than accommodating attitude of most governments in the region towards organized 
labor. Such an attitude undermined the labor network‘s plans to hold national consultations in all the 
ASEAN  member  states.
26  However,  the  fragmented  nature  of  regional  labor  groups  had  also 
undermined the advocacy activities of the network, which had also failed to ally itself more closely 
with other CSOs in collective endeavour.
27 In fact, one labor representative from Malaysia pointed 
out at a network meeting in 2005 that labor groups were only then beginning to discuss labor issues 
with university economists, who, like national governments, had subscribed to a competitiveness 
paradigm that tended to marginalize workers rights and social justice issues.
28  
 
The  regional  labor  network  on  the  ASEAN  Social  Charter  provided  extensive  local  data 
demonstrating secular declines in the real wages and earnings of workers over the past decade 
(see Santiago, 2005). Still, the network could not make much headway in gaining recognition for its 
alternative Social Charter and indeed, its more socially-attuned views on economic governance. 
This was due to the strong adherence by regional officials and key regional businesses as well as 
multinational corporations (MNCs) to a neoliberal, competitiveness intellectual paradigm that then 
informed economic policy and governing practices nationally and regionally. It is difficult for CSO 
advocacy to achieve concrete results if responsibility for the problem—workers rights and worker 
earnings—is  assigned  to  something  abstract  like  the  prevailing  economic  [neoliberal]  paradigm 
that—despite criticisms against it—has also delivered material wealth to other groups, especially 
the middle class and elites. Although governments may be responsible for adopting policies that 
marginalize the rights of workers by continuing to implicitly emphasize a ―low labor cost‖ approach 
to competitiveness, the issue of workers‘ rights does not elicit as much public sympathy as in other 
cases—where there is stark abuse, where bodily harm is clearly involved, and where the causal 
chain of responsibility is short and clearly established, thus, relatively easy to punish and correct.
29 
How CSOs frame issue areas and the kinds of causal stories they tell from facts and data are 
important to CSO advocacy. In this regard, developing alternate causal stories based on alternate 
theoretical or knowledge paradigms is crucial if labor groups are to make a convincing economic 
case for some form of social market economy.
30  
                                                 
26  Author‘s observations from attending the Workshop on the ASEAN Social Charter, organized by the Singapore 
regional office of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), 11 May 2005 in Singapore. 
27  Ibid. 
28  Ibid. 
29  On the need for short and clear causal accounts of responsibility for some issues, see Keck and Sikkink (1998: 27-
28).  
30  See the recent study by Novelli and Ferus-Comelo (2009).  
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This is why a significant element of regional CSO networking in Asia involves the production of 
critical knowledge that deconstructs prevailing concepts, policies and practices related (especially) 
to neoliberal economic globalization and its governance. It instead offers alternative governance 
arrangements that emphasize social justice, ecological issues, and the economic rights of workers, 
local communities and marginalized groups. Like Focus on the Global South (FOCUS), a number of 
other regional/transnational CSOs have also made critical knowledge production the central plank 
of  their  advocacy  activities.  Networks  such  as  ARENA  (Asian  Regional  Exchange  for  New 
Alternatives), the Third World Network (TWN), and the Asia-Pacific Research Network (APRN) have 
recognized  that  the  provision  of  intellectually  rigorous  analysis  can  aid  themselves  and  other 
advocacy groups by offering well-reasoned critiques of regional and global economic processes, as 
well  as  inform  the  agendas  and  work  programs  of  regional  institutions  like  APEC,  ASEM,  and 
ASEAN (Caouette, 2006).  
 
ARENA focuses primarily on producing theoretically and conceptually informed research work that 
advocacy groups could use. TWN has done a considerable amount of work on the WTO and IMF, 
particularly on how their policies and practices undermine many economic sectors in the developing 
world, including the rights of groups like farmers and other local communities. FOCUS also actively 
organizes CSO networks in the region, mostly but not exclusively, on a range of economic and 
economic-related  matters  such  as  trade  liberalization,  growing  corporate  power,  and  labor 
exploitation, using its internal research work to provide critical and alternative perspectives that 
challenge especially mainstream economic analysis on these issues. APRN‘s primary mission is to 
help the research capacity of regional CSOs (Acharya, 2003; Caouette, 2006). These regional CSO 
networks also extend beyond Southeast Asia, involving interactions with CSOs in the Middle East, 
South  Asia,  and  Northeast  Asia,  with  publications  (print  and  online)  and  conferences  the main 
means of disseminating research findings and information (Caouette, 2006).  
 
In South Asia, the South Asia Watch on Trade, Economics, and Environment (SAWTEE) performs 
a similar function in this subregion, its primary aim being to enhance the advocacy capacity of local 
communities and CSOs. Launched in December 1994, SAWTEE is a regional network of 11 South 
Asian  NGOs  from  Bangladesh,  India,  Nepal,  Pakistan,  and  Sri  Lanka,  with  a  secretariat  in 
Kathmandu. SAWTEE has links with media, universities, and research institutes such as the Centre 
for  International  Environmental  Law  in  Geneva,  International  Centre  for  Trade  and  Sustainable 
Development also in Geneva, and the Institute of Policy Studies, Colombo, among others, as well 
as global CSOs including Action Aid and OXFAM.
31 Through these links, SAWTEE conducts policy 
research on economics-related issues such as WTO rules, intellectual property rights, competition 
policy  as  well  as  the  environment,  and  development  aspects  of  trade  liberalization.  It  then 
disseminates its findings widely among NGOs, trade negotiators, regional and global organizations, 
and the donor community. SAWTEE, thus, emphasizes knowledge production, training activities for 
local communities and local NGOs, as well as engagement with officials and the media. 
 
These forms of CSO activity—aimed at developing alternate knowledge paradigms—are clearly in 
the neo-Gramscian mould, with the critical perspectives and alternative knowledge they generate 
supporting  a counter-hegemonic  challenge  to the  prevailing  hegemonic framework  of  neoliberal 
ideas and practices of national, regional and global institutions. But these types of CSOs are more 
likely to thrive only in more democratic states. However, because the regional level in Asia offers a 
wider range of accommodative sites from which CSOs may operate, CSOs may escape the reach 
                                                 
31  For a full list of SAWTEE‘s partners, see www.sawtee.org (accessed 10 October 2009). An alternate website on 
SAWTEE is www.facebook.com/pages/South-Asia-Watch-on-Trade-Economics-and-Environment-SAWTEE /31745       
1665536?v=info (accessed 13 November 2009). 20          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 63 
 
of governments that seek to control or even suppress them by locating in more accommodating 
settings.  In  Southeast  Asia,  for  instance,  where  CSOs  face  substantial  constraints,  ―nodes  of 
transnational activism‖ are located in Bangkok, Jakarta, and Manila, capitals that provide regional 
CSOs  with  an  accommodating  political  climate  and  the  necessary  ―practical  infrastructure‖  to 
facilitate regional CSO activities (Piper and Uhlin, 2004: 14). FOCUS is located in Bangkok while 
APRN is located in Manila. ARENA, however, was located in the more liberal environment of 1980s 
Hong Kong when it first began operations despite the network‘s Southeast Asian research focus. It 
is now located in Sungkonghoe University in Seoul.
32  
 
With an increasing number of CSOs now conducting their own research, regional CSO networks 
like ARENA and APRN that focused primarily on knowledge production are now engaging in direct 
advocacy activities, including participating in parallel civil society summits that track official summits 
of regional institutions.  
 
4.2   Regional Civil Society and Parallel Summitry  
 
A number of regional institutions in Asia, notably ASEAN and SAARC, permit CSOs to be formally 
affiliated with them as NGO affiliates. However, these regional organizations do not always consult 
extensively with their affiliated NGOs, many of which are professional bodies or trade associations 
grouping  together  medical  professionals,  lawyers,  accountants  and  the  like.  Neither  do  these 
organizations  have  any  formal  mechanism  to  engage  with  NGOs  and  CSOs.  Subregional 
institutional arrangements like GMS and CAREC involve a greater degree of regular civil society 
consultations on a variety of subregional projects primarily due to ADB‘s key role in these projects, 
as  ADB  is  committed  to  organizing  broader  consultations  with  communities  affected  by  these 
projects or their representatives. Other institutions like ASEM also involve consultations with CSOs 
on a number of institutional agenda items although no formal mechanism for such interactions has 
been established. APEC is far less responsive to CSO engagement, reflected in its low score of 
46% in the 2008 Global Accountability Report for external stakeholder engagement (One World 
Trust, 2008). While APEC does allow for CSO participation in its activities, it is limited, on invitation 
and at APEC‘s discretion.  
 
Nevertheless, Asian regional institutions provide a focal point for civil society activity, with regional 
CSOs often grouping in parallel forums to present views and critiques of institutional agendas and 
work  programs  in  the  hope  that  some  shift  will  take  place,  either  in  institutional  discourses, 
agendas, policies and/or processes (Curley, 2007). The best developed parallel summit of CSOs is 
the Asia-Europe People‘s Forum (AEPF), formed in 1996 when the first formal ASEM meeting was 
held in Bangkok. Despite the AEPF‘s growing visibility over the years, its regular presence parallel 
to  official  ASEM  Summits,  and  the  pronounced  desire  of  ASEM  to  engage  outside  its  official 
confines, only the Asia-Europe Foundation has been formally created as a component of ASEM. 
The Asia-Europe Business Forum (AEBF), on the other hand—although acting as the parallel forum 
for  business—has  nevertheless  become  more  closely  integrated  within  ASEM‘s  institutional 
structure and processes since 2005 (Gilson, 2007). The Chair of the 10
th AEBF participated in the 
tenth Senior Officials Meeting on Trade and Investment in PRC and in the 10
th Economic Ministers‘ 
Meeting in Rotterdam, both held in 2005 (AEBF, 2006). Similarly, while APEC formally interacts 
with  business,  it  does  not formally  deal  with  CSOs  on  any  regular  basis.  CSOs,  nevertheless, 
occasionally track official APEC Summits with parallel CSO summits. As already noted, APEC is 
not rated highly on its degree of engagement with civil society stakeholders.   
 
                                                 
32  See the ARENA website at www.arenaonline.org/content/view/17/54/.  
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Although the inhospitable attitudes of a number of Asian governments toward CSOs could explain 
the absence of formal institutional links between regional organizations and regional civil society, 
the  seeming  reluctance  of  member  states  to  consider  alternative  frameworks  of  economic 
governance beyond ―neoliberalistic‖ or ―competitiveness-focused agendas‖ of regional institutions 
also help explain institutional ambivalence toward greater engagement with CSOs while maintaining 
formal links with business groups (Gilson, 2007). Despite their diversity, the kinds of CSOs that 
participate  in  these  parallel  summits  share  a  consistent  commitment  to  an  ―anti-globalization‖ 
agenda  that  goes  against  the  preferred  liberalization  and  corporate-centered  agendas  of  these 
regional  institutions  and  their  constituent  member  governments  (ibid).  Whether  a  more 
accommodating  response  to  CSOs  is  forthcoming  depends  on  which  member  government  is 
hosting that year‘s annual summit. However, there are signs that regional institutions may be willing 
to pay some attention to these parallel forums. 
 
For  instance,  the  2006  Sixth  ASEM  Summit  in  Helsinki  emphasized  labor  rights  and  the 
environment, issues CSOs and trade unions had lobbied for since ASEM‘s founding. Ten years 
later,  these  issues  finally  found  a  receptive  hearing  by  the  Finnish  government  with  an  official 
acknowledgement from leaders that ASEM should develop a social pillar based on the ILO‘s Decent 
Work Agenda as well as a set of human and social rights (Gilson, 2007). In this way, ASEM may 
have taken a first step toward formalizing engagement with regional civil society by incorporating 
civil society concerns within the ASEM agenda. The Seventh ASEM Summit in Beijing in 2008 
repeated the  Helsinki  experience  by  first,  actively  accommodating  the  AEPF  parallel  summit in 
Beijing,  and  second,  by  reiterating  in  the  official  leaders‘  Declaration  the  importance  of  a  ―fair 
distribution of income,‖ enhancing social protection, and upholding labor standards and labor rights 
(set out under the 1998 ILO Declaration on the Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and the 
2008  ILO  Declaration  on  Social  Justice  for  a  Fair  Globalization  [ASEM,  2008]).  Although 
Declarations may be dismissed as mere rhetoric, they nevertheless establish a set of commitments 
by  ASEM  leaders  held  accountable  by  stakeholders. The  PRC‘s  accommodating  stance  to  the 
AEPF—where  a  range  of  critical  issues  on  human  rights,  democratization  and  economic/social 
justice were discussed—was lauded by the AEPF. The Forum was the second largest NGO forum 
held in Beijing since the 1995 NGO Women‘s Conference. About 200 of the 500-odd participants at 
the Forum came from CSOs that were part of the China NGO Network for International Exchanges 
(CNIE). Among the core items on which the AEPF will develop advocacy strategies before the next 
ASEM Summit are migrant workers, urban poverty, water justice, and the EU-ASEAN FTA, which 
the AEBF endorses.
33 For ASEM, it appears that parallel CSO summits are slowly becoming more 
closely  linked  to  official  institutional  processes,  indicating  that  official  views  toward  CSOs  are 
becoming  more  accommodating  as  an  increasing  number  of  issues  require  information, 
perspectives, and proposed solutions from CSOs, at the very least, as inputs for deliberation. 
 
In Southeast Asia, the ASEAN People‘s Assembly (APA) was the parallel civil society summit that 
tracked official ASEAN Summits until 2009. It was first organized in 2000 by the regional Track II 
think tank network, ASEAN-ISIS. Although APA was endorsed in principle by ASEAN officials, APA 
is better regarded as a parallel summit or a regional social forum rather than a formally integrated 
institutional component of ASEAN. Despite the role played by ASEAN-ISIS in initiating this non-elite 
CSO network and regional forum, the more authoritarian ASEAN governments refused to provide 
funding  support  for  APA, forcing  ASEAN-ISIS to  turn to  external  donors,  notably  the  Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA), the Asia Foundation, the Soros Foundation, and the 
Japanese government (Caballero-Anthony, 2005).  
                                                 
33  See  the  AEPF  website  at  http://ipdprojects.org/aepf/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=65: 
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APA brought together a wide cast of regional CSOs advocating on a range of issues and problems 
such  as  globalization  and  its  consequences  for  the  region‘s  people,  poverty  and  development, 
environmental  damage  and  management,  human  rights  and  democratization,  the  plight  of 
indigenous  and  marginalized  communities,  and  gender  and  the  empowerment  of  women 
(Caballero-Anthony, 2005). The annual APA forums are best seen as platforms for deliberation, or 
regional public spheres, for CSOs, local community groups, individuals and academics, as well as 
corporate figures who often have different views from those articulated by CSOs, especially on 
economic integration and labor rights. More specific APA Working Groups were also set up to focus 
on specific tasks to enhance the quality of governance in the region. Two of these tasks were to 
develop an ASEAN Human Rights Scorecard and to monitor the progress of democratization in 
member  states  by  establishing  democracy-promoting  or  democracy-inhibiting  indicators,  among 
other  tasks  (Caballero-Anthony,  2005).  Similar  working  groups  were  also  established  to 
operationalize the human security concept in Southeast Asia and to link it with human development. 
 
APA  may  have  enhanced  the  ―participatory‘‖  governance  credentials  of  ASEAN  by  providing  a 
space for the voices of ASEAN‘s ordinary people and marginalized communities to be heard by 
ASEAN  decision-makers.  However,  despite  APA‘s  close  to  8  years  of  existence,  no  formal, 
institutionalized mechanism that formally linked APA to ASEAN was set up (Morada, 2008). With 
the exception of the Secretary General, ASEAN officials who do attend the annual APA meetings 
do so in a private capacity, ostensibly to allow for a free and frank exchange of views between civil 
society and officials. This has not always happened, however, because many officials have not 
managed to step out of their official roles. Moreover, this approach accords these forums lesser 
status  than  forums  in  which  ASEAN  officials  participate  officially.  ASEAN‘s  engagement  with 
business  groups  has,  in  contrast,  been  institutionalized  through  the  ASEAN  Business  Advisory 
Council, which is often consulted on matters pertaining to economic issues, including ASEAN‘s 
agenda of regional economic integration. The growing dissatisfaction of CSOs with APA came to 
the fore when the Solidarity for Asian People‘s Advocacy (SAPA), which has an active Working 
Group on ASEAN, established the ASEAN People‘s Forum (APF), which coincides with the annual 
ASEAN Civil Society Conferences (ACSC)  and competed with the annual APA forums (Chandra, 
2008). To avoid duplication, ASEAN-ISIS chose to end APA in 2009. APF is now the sole people‘s 
forum in ASEAN. Aside from CSO dissatisfaction with the lack of progress made in APA to effect 
change  in  ASEAN,  the  APA-SAPA  divide  also  reflects  a  central  fault-line  in  ASEAN  between 
advocates of regional liberalization such as the conveners of APA (the regional scholars‘ network, 
ASEAN-ISIS) and regional business groups on the one hand, and those such as the SAPA-aligned 
civil society and labor groups on the other, more suspicious of the region‘s economic integration 
agenda and the region‘s penchant for bilateral free trade and economic partnerships (Chandra, 
2007).  
 
However, despite official recognition that ASEAN needs to engage with civil society to make the 
regional institution more ―people-centered‖, officials and business leaders are reluctant to do so, 
especially in the area of regional economic governance (Morada, 2008). One reason for this is the 
assumption by leaders and business elites that CSOs are not sufficiently qualified to speak on the 
economy—  unlike  business  groups  and  consultants,  civil  society  groups  are  not  regarded  as 
economic ―experts‖ (Nesadurai, 2004). This is also seen in APEC and ASEM and is also argued to 
plague CAREC and GMS, even if CSOs are extensively consulted on the many projects undertaken 
in CAREC and GMS. Yet, business forums have reportedly been accorded privileged  status in 
these subregional institutional arrangements, where their views and inputs are closely regarded by 
high-level officials (del Rosario, 2008). The same is true in South Asia. SAARC in 1992 granted 
formal  ―apex  body‖  status  to  a  South  Asian  business  network—the  SAARC  Chambers  of 
Commerce  and  Industry  (SAARC-CCI)—and  in  2000,  chose  to  extend  that  status  for  a  further  
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15 years without the need for a biennial review as initially planned. Moreover, the president of the 
SAARC-CCI is a permanent invitee to the SAARC Committee on Economic Cooperation (CEC) to 
offer private sector views to the Commerce Ministers of the seven SAARC members.
34 Civil society 
participation  in  SAARC  is  possible  through  what  SAARC  terms  ―recognized  bodies,‖  but  this 
category currently includes professional associations such as in medicine, radiology, architects, 
town planners, teachers and media practitioners.
35 CSO involvement in SAARC thus remains ad 
hoc and a parallel phenomenon through the  SAARC  Peoples‘ Forum—similar  to  other regional 
institutions in Asia. 
 
In fact, it was the closed and elitist nature of SAARC that prompted CSOs to organize the SAARC 
Peoples‘ Forum—that tracks official SAARC Summits—with the aim of drawing official attention to 
issues close to the livelihoods of South Asia‘s population of over 1 billion. Like the other parallel 
forums  discussed  above,  the  SAARC  Peoples‘  Forum  also  contests  the  prevailing  (neoliberal) 
economic and MNC-dominated paradigm of liberalization. A key issue for its advocacy is to demand 
an  end  to  advanced  country  agricultural  subsidies  and  the  monopolistic  control  of  agricultural 
commodities by a few multinational corporations (MNCs). These distort agricultural markets and 
undermine local agriculture and farmers‘ livelihoods, the main economic activity in South Asia. In 
addition, the Forum also advocates against unsustainable development, including inadequate river 
management; the patenting of life forms by MNCs; exploitative local land tenure systems; human 
trafficking, as well as genetic food modification (Ridoypur Declaration, 2005). Among others, the 
2005  Forum  saw  the  participation  of  SANTI,  Resistance  Network,  Genetic  Resources  Action 
International (GRAIN), and South Asia Network on Food, Ecology and Culture (SANFEC).  
 
4.3   Regional Civil Society as Partners of Regional Institutions 
 
From the preceding discussion, it appears that civil society activities that undermine  or  pose a 
threat  to  prevailing  governing  arrangements—and  groups  whose  interests  are  served  by  these 
arrangements—are  not  likely  to  find  a  welcome  response  from  national  governments  and  their 
regional institutional agents. In contrast, CSOs partnering governments in community development 
projects and other forms of service delivery—such as CSOs engaged in peace-building, disaster 
relief, and working with HIV/AIDS sufferers, for example—find a far more hospitable environment in 
which to conduct their work. In fact, regional institutions like ASEAN have often consulted regional 
CSOs on seemingly apolitical issues where CSOs have superior knowledge—HIV/AIDS being the 
most significant, but also extending to matters relating to youth and women  (Nesadurai, 2009). 
CSOs are generally more informed about regional issues involving HIV/AIDS; drugs; youth, women, 
and  children;  and  broader  issues  related  to  the  human  dignity  and  well-being  of  marginalized 
populations. And they are also willing to directly aid governments on preventive and ameliorative 
measures in working with communities and delivering services to them.  In these instances, the 
advocacy  work  of  CSOs  on  the  issues  they  champion  have  led  to  close  partnerships  with 
governments and regional institutions. 
 
Another example of successful advocacy that created a new governance regime with CSOs playing 
a key role is the Coral Triangle Initiative (CTI). In the CTI, close partnerships have been formed 
between national governments, regional institutions like ADB, global agencies such as the Global 
Environment  Facility,  global  CSOs  such  as  World  Wide  Fund  for  Nature  (WWF),  The  Nature 
Conservancy  and  Conservation  International,  and  the  local/regional  chapters  of  these  global 
organizations. Importantly, CSO advocacy also led to the 2007 establishment of a new regional 
                                                 
34  See the official SAARC website at www.saarcsec.org accessed 10 November 2009. 
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multilateral arrangement to govern coral reefs and the marine eco-system in the Coral Triangle 
Area in the Indo-Pacific Ocean—the Coral Triangle Initiative on Coral Reefs, Fisheries and Food 
Security.  Although  there  had  been  prior  cooperation  among  various  parties  in  this  area,  the 
formalization of these partnerships and the endorsement of the CTI by three regional institutions—
APEC, BIMP-EAGA, and ASEAN—is notable for the commitment of the governments in the region 
not always sensitive to environmental concerns. CTI member states include Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Timor Leste. The CTI has the potential to 
deliver multiple benefits for the subregion‘s 150 million people—(i) enhancing food security, local 
livelihoods, and tourism; (ii) ensuring marine conservation (including of coastal mangroves); and (iii) 
protection of coastal communities from storms and tsunamis (CTI Secretariat, nd).
36 The use of 
information and knowledge on the role of coral reefs in supporting a range of economic activities 
and  livelihoods  allowed  CSOs  to  demonstrate  the  clear  material  gains  that  would  result  from 
protecting coral reefs. By doing so, this issue has moved from  advocacy to partnership where, 
again, the research and knowledge of conservation CSOs will play a significant role. 
 
Despite continued wariness and even outright suspicion of CSOs and their regional/transnational 
networks, there is a growing trend even for the more critical CSOs to be allowed a hearing by 
officials, as the preceding discussion reveals. There is greater awareness and indeed, recognition, 
that CSOs do have better information and knowledge on a range of issues that require joint-official 
action. Whether these voices translate into concrete change is difficult to generalize, as outcomes 
depend on a range of factors. These include the nature and influence of the CSO or the advocacy 
network, the prevailing incentive structure (material and reputational) facing officials and institutions 
that are the target of CSO advocacy, and broader environmental factors such as the nature of the 
issue  area  in  question,  if  it  is  politically  sensitive,  and  the  availability  of  political  opportunities 
through  which  CSOs  can  act.  It  is,  however,  safe  to  say  that  when  CSOs  help  governments 
discharge their responsibilities, when a proposed new agenda offers a clear picture of the gains that 
will accrue, both material or reputational or both, and when the issue area in question does not 
undermine the core material interests of political elites, then genuine CSO partnerships with states 
or  regional  institutions  are  likely  to  develop.  However,  the  challenge  for  the  region  is  to  move 
beyond these ―safe‖ issues to ensure that even politically sensitive topics are allowed a hearing if 
the  aim  of  these  institutions  is  to  enhance  the  material  and  social  well-being  of  the  region‘s 
population.  
 
The extent to which CSOs are able to influence regional institutions will also depend on whether 
these institutions are designed in ways to accommodate CSOs within their institutional processes. 
Some of the preceding discussion has already highlighted the way in which key regional institutions 
such as ASEAN, APEC, ASEM, SAARC, GMS and CAREC engage (or do not) with CSOs. The 
general picture seems to be one of growing tolerance for CSO participation—and to some extent 
labor participation—in these institutions. Yet, the contrast with the privileged status accorded to 
business  groups  is  stark.  Even  ADB,  which  has  perhaps  the  most  advanced  institutional 
engagement  with  CSOs,  has  not  been  spared  criticism.  In  2007,  the  NGO  Forum  on  ADB,  a 
network  of  local,  national,  and  global  CSOs  that  monitor  and  advocate  against  harmful  ADB 
projects, criticized the consultative process between ADB and CSOs  on a clean energy project 
under CAREC for its lack of transparency, for not adhering to the minimum period between release 
of documents and the first consultation, and the ambiguous criteria by which CSOs are selected by 
ADB for subregional consultations. These, according to the letter from the NGO Forum on ADB, 
have resulted in a flawed consultative process as far as that particular project was concerned—the 
                                                 
36  See  also  the  website  of  the  CTI  Secretariat  www.cti-secretariat.net/about-cti/about-cti  and  the  website  of  the 
International  Union  for  Conservation  of  Nature  (IUCN),  www.iucn.org/?3194/Coral-triangle-initiative-celebrated 
(both accessed 13 November 2009).  
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ADB‘s Energy Strategy Consultation Paper—despite the ADB‘s stated commitment to consult with 
CSOs and local communities.
37 Yet, the posting of the critical letter on the ADB website suggests 
there are spaces within ADB where non-elite voices and those of affected communities may be 
articulated, even if not always perfectly.  
 
In fact, ADB‘s Accountability Mechanism adopted in 2003—to replace a previous inspection panel—
provides communities that feel hurt by ADB projects with two means of redress: (i) a consultation 
process in which an ADB Special Projects Facilitator (who reports directly to the ADB President) 
offers an additional channel of communication to solve the problem; and (ii) a compliance review 
process where an Independent Compliance Review Panel considers whether an ADB project that 
caused material harm to a community was the result of violations with ADB‘s operational policies 
and procedures. Any group of at least two persons in the country where the ADB-assisted project is 
located may file a complaint, as can a local representative appointed by the affected community.
38 
This mechanism allows ADB to exercise a high degree of accountability to its stakeholders, seen in 
ADB scoring 81% in terms of its overall accountability capabilities as reported by One World Trust‘s 
2007 Global Accountability Report, placing ADB among the top three organizations for the year 
under review (One World Trust, 2007). In fact, engagement is a two-way process: the constant 
monitoring by  regional civil society of ADB projects  and the  presence of CSOs at  ADB annual 
meetings  maintains  pressure  to  remain  accountable  to  stakeholders.  These  have  led  ADB  to 
change  some  of  its  policies  and  to  develop  redress  measures  following  CSO  opposition  to  a 
number of development projects, even though a number of these corrective strategies—like the 
resettlement program for villagers dislocated by the Nam Theun 2 hydroelectric project in the Lao 
People‘s Democratic Republic—funded by the ADB and the World Bank—were instituted only after 





5.   Conclusion: Regional Institutional Design for Enhancing the 
Quality of Governance  
 
This paper has provided a fairly comprehensive, through not exhaustive, discussion on civil society 
activity in the region, particularly that of transnational civil society and its relationship to regional 
institutions. A good part of the paper focused on labor and grassroots civic groups operating at the 
Southeast Asian, South Asian, and broader East Asian or Asia-Pacific levels, while some reference 
was made to the situation in Central Asia. The aim of this broad-based survey is to draw key trends, 
broad commonalities as  well as differences within Asia on the role and modes of engagement 
between  regional  institutions,  labor  and  civic  groups.  In  conclusion,  there  are  several  key 
observations.  
 
                                                 
37  The  letter  is  available  on  the  ADB  website  http://www.adb.org/Documents/Clean-Energy/Forum-Network.pdf 
(accessed 15 November 2009). 
38  See www.adb.org/Accountability-Mechanism/default.asp (accessed 10 November 2009). 
39  A similar example is the World Bank‘s Inspection panel created in 1993 to enhance accountability of the World 
Bank in lending. The Panel hears claims brought against World Bank policies, its loans and loan conditionalities by 
individuals and CSOs asked by affected communities to represent them (Economic Justice News Online, 1999). 
Unfortunately, in the past the Panel has been criticized for being controlled by the World Bank‘s powerful Board of 
Directors,  which  can  interfere  with  the  Panel‘s  work  to  appease  borrowing  governments.  In  fact,  Panel 
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First, there is a growing and vibrant regional civil society space in Asia in which a variety of CSOs 
participate  using  different  strategies  to  advance  a  wide  range  of  causes.  Regional  civil  society 
activism tends to address issues in seven broad categories: (i) economic rights and exclusions, 
including those related to labor and land rights; (ii) political change, democratization and human 
rights; (iii) sustainable development and the environment; (iv) gender; (v) poverty, development, 
trade,  and  globalization;  (vi)  regional  economic  liberalization  and  integration;  and  (vii)  human 
security. Although regional CSO activity covers a spectrum of strategies, they may be categorized 
as  (i)  advocacy,  which  includes  regional  networking  between  CSOs;  (ii)  civil  society  parallel 
summits that track the summits of more formal regional institutions; and (c) civil society working in 
partnership  with  governments  and  regional  institutions.  These  are  not  mutually  exclusive,  with 
CSOs often engaging in more than one of these activity types. Moreover, some of these activities 
follow  on  from  others;  for  instance,  regional  advocacy—persuading  and  challenging  officials  to 
change their position on some issue—could eventually lead to CSO partnerships with governments 
in implementing revised or reformed policies.  
 
A  second  observation  from  this  study  is  the  common  practice  among  regional  governments  to 
accord privileged status to business networks in relation to regional institutions rather than civil 
society networks. This has been common in ASEAN, APEC, ASEM, and SAARC, and to a lesser 
extent, in GMS and CAREC. One reason is the assumption by leaders and officials that CSOs are 
not sufficiently qualified to speak on economic governance issues—unlike business groups which 
are considered ―experts‖ on the economy. Although there appears to be a growing tolerance for 
CSO participation in regional institutions—even to the extent of allowing the more critical CSOs to 
be heard by officials—there remains a stark contrast with the privileged status accorded business 
groups on economics and economic-related issues such as infrastructure.  
 
A third observation is the crucial role information and knowledge in general plays in the various 
approaches  adopted  by  regional  CSOs  to  advance  their  respective  causes.  In fact,  the  use  of 
information  and  knowledge,  including  alternative  forms  of  knowledge,  has  been  central  to  civil 
society  advocacy.  Many  environmental  CSOs  have  gained  influence  and  have  succeeded  in 
achieving advocacy goals because of the information and knowledge resources they possess. Part 
of the reason for the relative lack of success of regional labor advocacy is this network‘s limited use 
of alternative theoretical or knowledge paradigms that help make a rigorously argued link between 
economic competitiveness on the one hand, and labor rights and social protection on the other. 
Although successful advocacy goes beyond having the right form of information and knowledge, 
labor groups probably did not make a sufficiently convincing economic case to aid their cause for 
labor justice through labor‘s ASEAN Social Charter. In fact, this is why many regional CSOs have 
adopted  a  twin  strategy:    advocacy  must  be  supported  by  the  development  and  articulation of 
alternate  knowledge  paradigms  that  permit  a  broader  understanding  of  economic  growth  and 
development—moving beyond the neoliberal knowledge that seems to drive much of the global and 
regional economic governance agenda—a central focus for much civil society advocacy. This type 
of  ―common  knowledge‖  may  offer  sufficient  material  incentive  to  [re]design  regional  economic 
governance programs. It could be done in ways that stress social justice issues, because better 
comprehension  among  stakeholders  can  help  address  material  economic  interests  of  all  key 
stakeholders.
40  Alternatively,  the  development  of  new  paradigms  of  governing  based  on 
theoretically sound and rigorous research may also be valuable in socializing states and regional 
institutions toward new agendas and approaches to regional and national governance, along the 
lines suggested by Amitav Acharya (2009) in his study for the ADB.  
 
                                                 
40  On the role of common knowledge, see Culpepper (2008).    
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A fourth observation, drawn from the theoretical discussion in Section 2, suggests how information 
and knowledge creation and dissemination by CSOs can help them play a key role in enhancing the 
quality of regional institutional governance, defined as the effectiveness of governance institutions 
and accountability to stakeholders. If institutional effectiveness and accountability depend on the 
―need  for  more  outside  checks  on  information‖  as  well  as  ―more  independent  information,‖  as 
Stephan  Haggard  (2009)  has  argued  in  his  study  for  ADB,  then  CSOs  are  a  category  of 
international actors that can assume responsibilities in international institutions. While accountability 
involving  non-elite  CSOs  is  increasingly  common  in  global  institutions—as  well  as  regional 
institutions such as the European Union—their role in Asian regional institutions remains limited, 
with the exception of the ADB. Although regional institutions accord a significant institutional role to 
elite  CSOs—such  as  the  regional  scholarly  networks  of  academics,  other  researchers,  and 
business networks, many regional institutions have yet to tap non-elite civil society‘s potential to 
enhance institutional effectiveness and accountability.  
 
There is certainly potential for Asia‘s CSOs to enhance the quality of regional institutions in the 
ways suggested. The information, knowledge and value perspectives (like social justice) that CSOs 
commonly  articulate  can  raise  the  chances  of  finding  an  effective  and  equitable  solution  to 
problems. Although some might suggest that institutional efficiency will be reduced by a cacophony 
of voices keying on any one issue, the plurality of information and perspectives available on an 
issue  enhances  the  likelihood  that  more  comprehensive,  and  ultimately,  politically  and  socially 
sustainable  solutions,  may  be  found.  This  is  true  even  if  it  takes  longer  to  reach  an  informed 
decision. Thus, it is not only like-minded CSOs that should be accommodated; even CSOs that 
criticize or challenge regional institutions, their agendas, policies and programs, or that articulate 
positions against the dominant intellectual paradigms within these institutions, need to be engaged. 
It is only by doing so that the region‘s institutions will be able to tap into the diversity of perspectives 
and solutions available on any one issue or problem. By engaging with CSOs, regional institutions 
can pool a range of  competencies and collaborate on solving  shared problems. Thus, regional 
institutions need to be restructured to accommodate  a diverse range of inputs from an already 
vibrant CSO sector in Asia. Three specific measures are suggested:  
 
(i)  One suggestion is for regional institutions to provide a regional ―public sphere‖ in which a 
variety of civil society voices are heard by institutional elites, where institutional elites and 
CSOs can interact and hopefully engage each other in reasoned public discussion. While 
this does not always guarantee that officials will adopt CSO perspectives and solutions, at 
the very least, the discursive space may be widened, and which could over time lead to 
further  substantive  change  as  suggested  by  Keck  and  Sikkink‘s  model  of  advocacy 
networks, and as seen in a limited way in the ASEAN human rights experience and the case 
of the Asia-Europe Peoples‘ Forum.  
 
(ii) A second suggestion is for regional institutions to develop more formalized or regularized 
mechanisms  (as  opposed  to  ad  hoc  measures)  through  which  CSOs  can  submit formal 
research reports, position papers, and comments on the regional institutional agenda. These 
inputs  to  be  considered  during  official  deliberations  on  policy  matters.  Related  to  this, 
creating a civil society division or office within regional institutions, such as found in the ADB, 
can  help  integrate  CSOs  into  institutional  processes.  Not  only  will  this  contribute  to 
enhanced effectiveness, given the merits of knowledge diversity on governance outcomes 
as discussed above, institutional accountability may be enhanced as well.  
 
(iii) The third suggestion is for regional institutions to put in place accountability mechanisms 
that  include the following features  used  by  One World Trust  in  its Global  Accountability 28          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 63 
 
Reports  to  assess  how  accountable  organizations  and  corporations  are:  institutional 
engagement  with  stakeholders  (including  CSOs);  transparency;  evaluation  mechanisms; 
and  procedures  for  complaints  and  responses.  ADB‘s  Accountability  Mechanism  is  one 
example  that  could  provide  a  template  for  regional  institutional  design,  while  the  World 
Bank‘s  Inspection  Panel  is  another  possible  model.  Both  these  are  ―bottom-up‖ 
accountability mechanisms in which stakeholders and their CSO representatives can bring 
claims against these institutions (internal and independent evaluation processes tend to be 
top-down mechanisms). Although the presence of such bottom-up panels does not mean 
than institutional accountability will always be enhanced—as criticisms against the World 
Bank‘s Inspection Panel highlighted (see footnote 39 in this paper) the very presence of 
such mechanisms could catalyze more responsive behavior on the part of institutional elites, 
particularly if CSOs avail themselves of the opportunities afforded by such mechanisms to 
hold policymakers to account.   
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